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The main purpose of this chapter is to examine the extent to which Pierre 
Bourdieu may be described as a ‘hermeneutic sociologist’. As demonstrated in 
the following analysis, Bourdieu draws upon the intellectual tradition commonly 
known as ‘hermeneutics’.1 Here, ‘hermeneutics’ is conceived of as a 
methodological approach concerned, above all, with the interpretive facets of 
human existence. As is widely acknowledged, the history of hermeneutics can be 
traced back to ancient Greek philosophy. During the Middle Ages and the 
Renaissance, it established itself as an influential field of biblical studies, before 
being broadened to include the textual exploration of classic cultures and 
ancient civilisations. With the arrival of German romanticism and idealism, 
hermeneutics entered a new period, in which it was converted into an 
increasingly philosophical endeavour. In this context, the narrow preoccupation 
with the reading of texts was gradually replaced by the wide-ranging engagement 
with the species-constitutive status of symbolic forms – especially with regard to 
communication, understanding and language. In the modern era, hermeneutics 
designates an essential reference point in the humanities and social sciences – 
primarily, in continental European and Anglo-Saxon currents of critical enquiry. 
Among the most prominent modern scholars associated with hermeneutics are 
Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher (1768–1834), Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), 
Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) and Paul 
Ricœur (1913–2005). Instead of relegating it to the past, however, it is vital to 
recognise that hermeneutics continues to play a pivotal role in the writings of major 
contemporary thinkers. Noteworthy in this respect are continental European 
scholars such as Karl-Otto Apel (1922–), Jürgen Habermas (1929–) and Jacques 
Derrida (1930–2004), as well as Anglo-Saxon scholars such as Donald H. Davidson 
(1917–2003), Richard Rorty (1931–2007), john McDowell (1942–) and Judith 
Butler (1956–). Far from being reducible to a merely philosophical school of 
thought, hermeneutics has had a major impact upon the development of social- 
scientific disciplines – particularly sociology, anthropology and psychology. In 
sociology, its influence manifests itself, most clearly, in conceptual and empirical 
frameworks focusing on the socio-ontological centrality of everyday life – that is, 
in interpretive sociology, phenomenological sociology, dramaturgical sociology, 
symbolic-interactionist sociology, micro-sociology and ethnomethodology. 
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Given his in-depth engagement with the aforementioned disciplines and modes 
of sociological exploration, it should not come as a surprise that hermeneutics 
represents a constitutive component of Bourdieu’s undertaking. Yet, in the 
literature, one finds little in the way of a systematic discussion of the place that 
hermeneutics occupies in Bourdieu’s oeuvre.2 Indeed, the hermeneutic aspects of 
Bourdieu’s writings are largely overlooked by both his supporters and his 
detractors. This analytical oversight makes it difficult, if not impossible, to do 
justice to the epistemic complexity of Bourdieu’s plea for a reflexive sociology. 
As shall be argued in this chapter, Bourdieu may be regarded as a ‘hermeneutic’ 
– or, at least, ‘hermeneutics-inspired’ – thinker insofar as his work is marked by a 
profound interest in the nature of ‘interpretation’. Bourdieu’s sustained concern 
with the interpretive facets of social life has major implications for his conception 
of human existence.3 As a thorough examination of his writings reveals, Bourdieu 
conceives of ‘interpretation’ as a socio-cognitive process that is crucial not only to 
procedures of sociological investigation, conducted by experts, but also, in a more 
fundamental sense, to quotidian practices, performed by ordinary agents. In order 
to illustrate this, the chapter sheds light on ten significant elements underlying the 
‘hermeneutic Bourdieu’. As elucidated in this study, the hermeneutic spirit per- 
vading Bourdieu’s research programme is reflected in the fact that he stresses the 
(1) socio-relational, (2) practical, (3) unconscious, (4) situational, (5) doxic, (6) 
contingent, (7) meaning-laden, (8) experiential, (9) resourceful and (10) power- 
laden constitution of human existence. By way of conclusion, the chapter draws 
attention to some key questions arising from the critical analysis of these 
‘hermeneutic’ elements, notably in terms of the pivotal role they play in both 
sociological enquiry and everyday life. 
 
1.   Socio-relational 
Bourdieu studies human existence in terms of its socio-relational constitution. On 
this account, the human world can be conceived of as a universe of ‘social 
relations’ (1977[1972]). On the one hand, it is a product of ‘a process of 
continuous creation’ (ibid.: 189). As such, it is structured by the embodied 
practices performed by purposive entities. On the other hand, it contains ‘within 
itself the principle of its own continuation’ (ibid.: 189) and, thus, ‘frees agents 
from the endless work of creating or restoring social relations’ (ibid.: 189). As 
such, it structures the environment in which circumstantially constrained 
subjects undertake their actions, thereby shaping quotidian performances as well 
as those who carry them out. Bourdieu urges us to resist the theoreticist tendency 
to abstract human practices from the concrete contexts in which they take place.4 
In order to overcome the scholastic pitfalls of idealism, formalism and 
transcenden- talism, it is essential to be aware of the detrimental consequences 
resulting from ‘the ignorance of the social conditions of production and 
circulation’ (Bourdieu 1980a: 54).5 Only insofar as we take into account the 
relationally constituted and socially constructed settings by which everyday 
practices are conditioned is it possible to comprehend the relative determinacy 
permeating all modes of human 
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agency. In short, Bourdieu’s approach can be characterised as a hermeneutics of 
social relations.6 
 
2.   Practical 
Bourdieu proposes to explore human existence in terms of its practical consti- 
tution. In opposition to ‘hermeneutic idealism’ (Bourdieu 1980a: 53; cf. ibid.: 58, 
62, 158, 161), which fails to grasp the empirical constellations generated by 
symbolically mediated interactions, Bourdieu seeks to do justice to the fact that 
human life is inconceivable without the unfolding of social practices. From a 
reflexive-sociological perspective, the intellectual exercise of aiming ‘to under- 
stand for the sake of understanding’ (ibid.: 53)7 delivers little in the way of 
social-scientific enlightenment. By contrast, one of the principal points of a 
‘pragmatic hermeneutics’ (see Bourdieu 1980a: 62) is to acknowledge that human 
understanding constitutes a fundamental social practice. Irrespective of whether 
one focuses on the interpretive activities undertaken by laypersons or on those 
accomplished by experts, the multiple ways in which humans relate to reality are 
possible only as value-laden performances by means of which understanding- 
seeking agents convert the givenness of the world into a state of affairs that is not 
simply always already ‘out there’ but – at least potentially – always still to be 
suffused with meaning. Before transforming themselves into subjects capable of 
speech and reflection, humans are capable of action and intervention. According 
to Bourdieu, it is by virtue of their sens pratique ‘within’, rather than their sens 
théorique ‘about’, the world that agents invent the socio-cultural parameters of 
their existence (cf. Bourdieu 1997b: 63–64). In short, Bourdieu’s approach can be 
described as a hermeneutics of practice.8 
 
3.   Unconscious 
Bourdieu posits that one of the most powerful dimensions of human existence is its 
unconscious constitution. As socio-historically situated entities, we are constantly 
immersed in background horizons, upon whose symbolic resources we draw when 
attributing meaning to, engaging with and acting upon reality. To a considerable 
extent, traditions operate ‘behind our backs’: we permanently reproduce – and, 
potentially, transform – behavioural, ideological and institutional patterns of value- 
laden encounters with the world. Regardless of whether our background 
involvement takes place in the preparative ‘back stages’ or in the performative 
‘front stages’ of our compartmentalised lives, the following of traditions constitutes, 
to a substantial degree, an unconscious process, carried out in ways that escape – 
largely or, often, completely – the awareness of those submerged in them. Even – 
or, perhaps, especially – the most powerful vehicle of human consciousness (i.e. 
language) is impregnated with multiple dimensions, expressions and layers of our 
unconscious: the reliance upon preconceptions, presuppositions and prejudices is 
built into the nature of language and, indeed, lies at the core of our habitualised 
ways of contributing to the daily construction of reality. 
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Coping with the complexities of social life would be unsustainably demanding 
if we had to call particular aspects of our existence into question all the time and 
if, consequently, we were unable – or, possibly, unwilling – to take part in the 
intuitive compliance with daily routines. Our unconscious permits us to take the 
apparent givenness of subjects and objects, which lies at the core of our being-in- 
the-world, at face value. In fact, our capacity to take foundational aspects of our 
existence for granted is vital to our ability to convert ourselves into fully fledged 
inhabitants of the universe. Our enclosure in the world is contingent upon our 
preparedness to participate in the quotidian construction of reality by mobilising 
the species-constitutive resources of humanity. 
To be sure, our distinctly human – and, arguably, historico-generative – 
resources manifest themselves in numerous forms of capital: social, cultural, 
educational, linguistic, political, economic and symbolic capital – to mention only 
a few.9 When making use of, competing for or exchanging relationally contingent 
resources, however, we do so, for the most part, unconsciously. The unconscious 
constitution permeating key domains of our existence is a sine qua non of the 
emergence, development and functioning of social life. The dispositional 
composition of habitus reflects the positional configuration of interactionally 
created fields. The homological relationship between habitus and field would be 
unsustainable without agents’ competence to use their sens pratique, rather than 
their sens théorique, when navigating their way through their monde empirique. 
Bourdieu reminds us, then, that sociologists need to be critical of the various social 
functions of the unconscious – especially with respect to their power to generate 
culturally codified mechanisms of perception, appreciation and action. In short, 
Bourdieu’s approach can be regarded as a hermeneutics of the unconscious.10 
 
4.   Situational 
From a Bourdieusian perspective, human existence needs to be grasped in terms 
of its situational constitution. In fact, every human performance is spatiotem- 
porally situated. Placed in both space and time, human agents are embodied 
entities. As such, their practices are embedded not only within the materially con- 
stituted and symbolically mediated spheres of their environments but also within 
the physiologically arranged and phenomenologically experienced boundaries of 
their own bodies. The former are illustrated in the consolidation of positionally 
structured fields; the latter are reflected in the emergence of dispositionally 
organised forms of habitus. Situatedness, however, is a double-edged sword: on 
the one hand, it is empowering to the extent that it permits people to undertake 
actions by drawing upon the resources they encounter within different sets of 
circumstances and within their own bodies; on the other hand, it is 
disempowering to the extent that it obliges people to carry out actions within the 
structural limits of the positional and dispositional determinacy pervading every 
aspect of their corporeal immersion in constantly shifting realities. 
The ‘conditions of possibility’ (Bourdieu 1980a: 191; cf. Bourdieu 1997b: 
26),11 which are dictated by both positional and dispositional determinants of 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
agency, constitute the underlying parameters for what can and cannot be done in 
terms of both the opportunities and the constraints with which people are 
confronted when relating to, engaging with and acting upon reality. As situated 
beings, we are continuously involved in the world:12 involved in referring to it, in 
taking part in it, in attributing meaning to it and – perhaps, most significantly –  
in shaping it. Tautologically speaking, it is due to our spatiotemporal situatedness 
that we are involved in being involved in processes of involvement. The ‘spaces 
of possibilities’13 that we inhabit, as well as the ‘bodies of possibilities’14 in which 
we are trapped, constitute socio-ontological preconditions for ‘the experience of 
our inclusion in this world’ (Bourdieu 1997b: 64).15 Far from being reducible to a 
monolithic state of affairs, however, our situatedness in the universe possesses 
multiple dimensions: social, cultural, political, ideological, economic and 
geographic – to mention but a few. To exist within the world as a human subject 
means to be situated in reality as an embodied carrier of agency, with a 
positionally variable and dispositionally adjustable sense of both freedom and 
necessity. In short, Bourdieu’s approach can be considered a hermeneutics of the 
situational.16 
 
5.   Doxic 
For Bourdieu, human existence possesses, inevitably, a doxic constitution. As 
such, it is shot through with common sense, grounded in the taken-for-granted- 
ness that agents attach to the objective, normative and subjective dimensions of 
their lives. As immersive entities, we make sense of the world through the 
construction of materially embedded and symbolically mediated realities. Before 
we encounter the world, we are always already situated in it. Before we have – or 
think we have – experiences of rational or emotional disclosure, we are always 
already enclosed in a universe that presents itself to us as the focal reference point 
of our daily perceptions, appreciations, reflections, interpretations and actions. 
Doxa – that is, the taken-for-grantedness of particular aspects of our existence 
based on common sense – permits us to draw upon largely ‘unconscious 
presuppositions’ (Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron 1968: 105)17 and ‘pre- 
constructions that are inherent in the routine of everyday discourse’ (Bourdieu 
1982b: 34).18 Thus, it enables us to convert our relation to the world into a 
meaning-laden encounter without compelling us to question the validity, let alone 
the legitimacy, of the symbolic resources that we mobilise in order to make sense 
of our experience of reality. 
To be clear, meaning-ladenness is not tantamount to meaningfulness; a 
meaning-laden life may be perceived as partly or entirely meaningless by those 
who experience it. Even the denial of meaning, however, is conceivable only as a 
projection of meaning. The empowering force of doxa lies in its capacity to allow 
those who reproduce it to project meaning upon the world without having to cast 
doubt on the cogency of their presuppositionally filtered absorption of and 
interaction with reality. In this sense, doxa exercises its quotidian power with 
quasi-magical attraction and seemingly all-inclusive comprehension.    Prejudice 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
(Vorurteil) turns into an advantage (Vorteil) when it bestows those who reinforce 
it with the self-granted privilege to do how they please simply because it pleases 
them. Doxa provides a treasure trove of unjustified justifications, which may well 
be justifiable, but which do not need to be justified as long as they equip agents 
with the capacity to establish an intuitively regulated relation to themselves and 
to their environment. 
‘Illusio is field-specific doxa’ (Susen 2007: 191, italics in original). As such, it 
epitomises a worldview that emerges out of one’s immersion within a social 
microcosm, whose idiosyncratic logic of functioning makes it different from 
other arenas of interaction within the societal macrocosm. ‘Illusio is that way of 
being in the world, of being occupied by the world’ (Bourdieu 2000[1997]: 135, 
italics in original), of being situated in and surrounded by assemblies of 
actualities without questioning, let alone denying, their legitimacy. As ‘the 
undiscussed condition of discussion’ (Bourdieu 1997b: 122),19 it converts the 
apparent givenness of the rules governing particular fields of social reality into a 
source of taken-for-grantedness. Illusio makes us believe that the field is 
everything and that, consequently, the world is the field (see Susen 2007: 191). 
Without the field- specific doxa of illusio, we would find it difficult, if not 
impossible, to buy into the underlying logic of relationally constructed domains 
of interaction, whose partial ubiquity converts our encounters with the world into 
context-laden experiences of existential contingency. Doxa is there to be there, 
that is, it is there to suffuse the ‘thereness’ of the world with the ceaseless search 
for meaning, undertaken by those who inhabit it as hermeneutic beings. In short, 
Bourdieu’s approach can be understood as a hermeneutics of doxa.20 
 
6.   Contingent 
From a Bourdieusian angle, one of the most noteworthy features of human exist- 
ence is its contingent constitution. Contingency permeates all aspects of social 
reality, including its seemingly most consolidated dimensions. Symbolically 
mediated representations of the objective, normative and subjective facets of our 
existence are no less contingent than the elements to which they are supposed to 
refer. To conceive of ‘every scientific theory […] as a historically constituted and 
temporary code […] for an era’ (Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron 1968: 
47)21 requires accepting that even evidence-based claims to epistemic validity 
cannot rise above the ubiquity of spatiotemporal contingency. As ‘the historical 
critique of unconscious presuppositions’ (Bourdieu 1999: 334) illustrates, all 
relationally constructed spheres of action and reflection are situated in constantly 
shifting horizons of worldly developments and interventions. Particular sets of 
behavioural, ideological and institutional patterns may be considered appropriate 
in one context and inappropriate in another context, varying across time and 
space. Undoubtedly, the contingency that pervades human existence is 
symptomatic of the fragility underpinning the standards of conduct, cognition and 
custom that emerge in particular domains of sociality (cf. Boltanski, Rennes and 
Susen 2010, 2014[2010]). Put differently, in the social world – which is sustained 
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by apparent substances and substantial appearances, that is, by representational 
realities and real representations – nothing is ever forever. 
What can be constructed can be deconstructed and, if required, reconstructed. 
The social world is in a constant state of flux, because those who shape and are, 
in turn, shaped by it incessantly act upon – and, hence, either reproduce or 
transform – it. Contingency is built so deeply into the condition of humanity that 
every form of sociality seems to be little more than a transient epiphenomenon of 
a perpetually shifting horizon of agency, which serves as the background to the 
theatre of role plays performed by field-embedded entities. The existential 
challenge with which all human agents are confronted is whether or not they are 
able, rather than willing, to live with contingency (see Susen 2015a: esp. ch. 4).  
It is wishful thinking to believe that we can escape contingency; the more 
interesting question, in this respect, is what we do (and how we deal) with it. As 
a resource, contingency can be exploited by us, permitting us to face up to the 
radical openness of history. As an obstacle, contingency may paralyse us, leading 
us to abandon the search for ontological security. In short, Bourdieu’s approach 
can be interpreted as a hermeneutics of contingency.22 
 
7.   Meaning-laden 
From a Bourdieusian point of view, the nature of human existence cannot be 
grasped without accounting for its meaning-laden constitution. The clear-cut 
distinction between ‘facts’ and ‘values’ collapses if we recognise that all social 
facts are value-laden just as all values are fact-laden.23 In other words, the world 
of social facts is permeated by values, just as the world of social values is 
pervaded by facts. From the perspective of naïve realism, ‘facts speak for 
themselves’ (see Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron 1968: 56). From the 
vantage point of critical realism, by contrast, ‘facts do not speak’ (ibid.: 56)24 at 
all. Indeed, the ‘blind evidences’ (ibid.: 77)25 – that is, the tacit assumptions upon 
which we rely in order to function as culturally competent entities – become 
‘blinding evidences’ (ibid: 77)26 to the degree that we fail to acknowledge that the 
meanings we project upon the world – especially those that we take for granted – 
can be called into question. 
The meaning-bearing construction of reality contains multiple dimensions: 
 
First, as meaning-creating entities, we produce meaning ‘about’ the world: 
the creation of meaning is a constitutive component of the symbolic 
production of society. Second, as meaning-projecting entities, we attribute 
meaning ‘to’ the world: the projection of meaning is pivotal to the symbolic 
organization of society. Third, as meaning-perceiving entities, we absorb 
meaning ‘from’ the world: the perception of meaning is a sine qua non of the 
symbolic internalization of society. Fourth, as meaning-interpreting entities, 
we process meaning ‘beyond’ the world: the interpretation of meaning is vital 
to the symbolic subjectivization of society. Fifth, as meaning-reciprocating 
entities, we exchange meaning ‘with’ the world: the reciprocation of meaning 
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is the driving force of the symbolic ritualization of society. Finally, as 
meaning-fusing entities, we merge meaning ‘through’ the world: the fusion 
of meaning lies at the heart of the symbolic unification of society. 
(Susen 2013c: 203–204, italics in original)27 
 
Meaning enables us to convert realms of facticity into domains of comprehensi- 
bility. The provinces of meaning that we generate, and tap into, when establishing 
a symbolically mediated relation to reality are vehicles of signification, which are 
under constant reconstruction as they need to adapt to changing environments and 
situations. 
Three spheres of human existence are crucial to the construction of meaning: 
objectivity, normativity and subjectivity. As subjects capable of speech and 
reflection, we raise three main types of validity claims: first, assertive and con- 
stative validity claims, in relation to ‘the’ world of objectivity; second, regulative 
and evaluative validity claims, in relation to ‘our’ world of normativity; and, 
third, expressive and individuative validity claims, in relation to ‘my’ world of 
subjectivity. Thus, meaning is constructed with respect to the ‘natural’, ‘social’ 
and ‘personal’ realms of our existence. 
When seeking to grasp the sociological significance of meaning in terms of the 
pivotal role it plays in the unfolding of everyday life, two epistemic levels are 
crucial: 
 
• on the one hand, the internal level, referring to the production of meaning 
from the point of view of those who generate and experience it as ordinary 
people (‘from the inside’); 
• on the other hand, the external level, referring to the analysis of meaning from 
the point of view of those who describe and scrutinise it as critical researchers 
(‘from the outside’).28 
 
In this sense, we are dealing with a ‘cycle of reciprocity’ (Bourdieu 1980a: 178):29 
both as ordinary agents and as specialised scientists we need to co-articulate, if 
not reconcile, ‘the truth that one may barely call subjective’ (ibid.: 178)30 and ‘the 
truth that one calls objective’ (ibid.: 178).31 The double-hermeneutic task with 
which we are confronted, therefore, consists in exploring the meaning-laden 
constitution of human existence both ‘within’ and ‘beyond’ the sphere of 
everyday life: the attempt to convert meaning into an object of study constitutes 
a meaning-laden act itself. In short, Bourdieu’s approach can be comprehended as 
a hermeneutics of meaning.32 
 
8.   Experiential 
For Bourdieu, a crucial facet of human existence can be found in its experiential 
constitution, that is, in the innumerable ways in which the world can be 
experienced by its hermeneutically equipped inhabitants. Human beings relate to 
the objective, normative and subjective domains of their lives as embodied entities. 
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It is through their habitus – that is, through an apparatus of objectively external- 
ised, normatively naturalised and subjectively internalised dispositions – that 
members of humanity attribute meaning to, engage with and shape reality. The 
schemes of perception, appreciation and action that are built into field-specific 
forms of habitus are relationally constituted reflections of the social conditions of 
production that permeate their horizons of daily experience. Surely, from a 
Bourdieusian standpoint, one of the key tasks of critical social science is to resist 
‘the illusion of immediate evidence [and] the temptation to universalise uncon- 
sciously a singular experience’ (Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron 1968: 
100).33 Instead of relying on common sense and on the first-hand experiences upon 
which it may be based, reflexive investigators need to be suspicious of ordinary 
preconceptions and contextualise the practices from which they emanate. 
In scientific enquiry, experience is a curious affair. On the one hand, it may be 
conceived of as a source of objective and context-transcendent knowledge, whose 
validity rises above the spatiotemporal specificity of historically contingent 
constellations of sociality. On the other hand, it may be regarded as a source of 
subjective and context-immanent knowledge, whose validity depends on the 
acceptability attributed to it by particular agents, within specific sets of circum- 
stances, and on the basis of idiosyncratic parameters. The former view tends to be 
endorsed by positivist approaches, which are guided by the ambition to generate 
objectively reliable, universally valid and empirically substantiated knowledge. 
The latter view tends to be advocated by interpretivist approaches, which insist 
upon the perspective-, value- and context-ladenness of all knowledge claims. 
Rather than opposing these two traditions of investigation to one another, 
however, the challenge consists in combining and cross-fertilising them (cf. 
Susen 2011d: esp. 49–53, 69, 73–75, 78). 
A central aim of the Bourdieusian project is to overcome counterproductive 
antinomies in the social sciences.34 Arguably, one of the most fundamental, and 
also most ruinous, oppositions that has shaped and, to some extent, polarised 
debates and controversies in the social sciences since they have come into 
existence is the epistemic antagonism between objectivism and subjectivism, 
which is both reflected and embedded in the aforementioned canonical rivalry 
between positivism and interpretivism.35 Whichever of these currents of thought 
one may favour, it is vital to recognise that experience constitutes a foundational 
dimension of human existence (cf. Susen 2007: 297–301). As such, it represents 
a precondition for the very possibility of social life. For there is no society 
without a lifeworld, that is, there is no social world without an experienced world 
(monde vécu or Lebenswelt). The world of human beings is a world of 
experienced and experiencing entities, capable of converting their experiences 
into the primary source of their knowledge (Homo sapiens) and into the ultimate 
resource for their practices (Homo practicus). Through their constant exposure 
to an external world, which they are destined to construct and reconstruct, as 
well as through their continuous immersion in their internal world, to which they 
have privileged access, subjects capable of reason-guided performance have 
learned to attribute meaning to, engage with and act upon reality by drawing 
upon their 
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experiences, which serve as the ultimate reference point for the ceaseless 
reinvention of their species-distinctive condition, known as ‘humanity’. In short, 
Bourdieu’s approach can be conceived of as a hermeneutics of experience.36 
 
9.   Resourceful 
Bourdieu proposes to examine human existence by shedding light on its resource- 
ful constitution. Particularly important in this regard is the analysis of different 
types of capital: social capital, cultural capital, educational capital, linguistic 
capital, political capital, economic capital and symbolic capital – to mention but 
the most significant variants. Crucial for the functioning of power dynamics, 
especially in highly differentiated societies, is the interconvertibility37 of capital: 
access (or non-access) to one type of capital may increase (or decrease) one’s 
chances of acquiring another form of capital. While every social field is relatively 
autonomous in that it possesses an idiosyncratic logic of functioning, every type 
of capital is relatively self-sufficient in that it provides a specific kind of resource.  
     Yet, just as social microcosms are – at the same time – relatively independent 
and relatively interdependent, so are different sorts of capital. Nowhere is this 
more apparent than in the analysis of the foundational status of social capital. 
None of the other types of capital could exist without social capital. In fact, all 
types of capital are derivatives of social capital, since they are relationally 
constructed and depend on the existence of interactional networks. In order to 
obtain cultural capital, one needs to be part of a group whose members share a 
given set of values, conventions and traditions. In order to receive educational 
capital, one needs to be exposed to the learning processes that are formally or 
informally provided by fellow human beings – notably by family members and 
friends, as well as by teachers, trainers and instructors. In order to have access to 
linguistic capital, one needs to be immersed in a language community. In order to 
cultivate political capital, one needs to enter the arena of deliberating subjects. In 
order to accumulate economic capital, one needs to participate in the game of 
competing for assets and wealth. In order to get hold of symbolic capital, one 
needs to gain recognition from those who are in a position to confirm one’s status 
and to decipher the value of the field-specific currency employed to represent  it. 
In brief, there is no capital without social capital. The emergence of any form of 
capital hinges upon having access to some minimal amount of social capital. 
The conversion (or, in many cases, the reconversion) of one type of capital into 
another type of capital allows for the translation (or, more commonly, the retrans- 
lation) of one sort of resource into another. just as agents are able to move from 
field to field and just as they are equipped with the multifunctional capacity to be 
immersed simultaneously in several fields, they are able to make use of different 
types of capital in different contexts and, if necessary, draw upon different types 
of capital at the same time. Social agents, then, are ‘plural actors’38 to the extent 
that they are capable of mobilising different resources in different settings. The 
field constitutes an asymmetrically organised arena of positionally structured 
resources;  habitus  represents  a  multi-dimensionally  embodied  apparatus    of 
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dispositionally structured resources; capital denotes an objectively externalised 
and subjectively internalised stock of both positionally and dispositionally struc- 
tured resources. We perceive, appreciate and act upon the world in accordance 
with the field-, habitus- and capital-specific resources that are at our disposal. In 
the grand scheme of things, the ultimate resource for human agents is humanity 
itself. Yet, resources are not only differentiated, in terms of varying sources of 
power, but also unequally distributed, in terms of diverging degrees of access to 
power. In short, Bourdieu’s approach can be referred to as a hermeneutics of 
social resources.39 
 
10.   Power-laden 
Bourdieu posits that, as critical social scientists, we need to study human exist- 
ence by uncovering its power-laden constitution. In fact, human existence is 
‘laden’ in a number of ways – all of which are, ultimately, related to the exercise 
of power (see Susen 2014a: esp. 21–24; and Susen 2015a: esp. 117–118). 
 
• It is context-laden in the sense that, as embodied entities, we are embedded in 
spatiotemporally contingent sets of circumstances. 
• It is value-laden in the sense that, as cultural entities, we are exposed to the 
overt or subtle influence of behavioural, ideological and institutional codes, 
patterns and conventions. 
• It is meaning-laden in the sense that, as interpretive entities, we are immersed 
in the universe of understanding – seeking to make sense of the objective, 
normative and subjective dimensions of reality, to which we relate through 
symbolically constructed vehicles of comprehensibility. 
• It is perspective-laden in the sense that, as biased entities, we approach, 
attribute meaning to and interact with the world from the particular places that 
we occupy in the universe, mobilising the dispositional resources that we have 
acquired throughout our lives when encountering not only other subjects and 
objects but also ourselves. 
• It is interest-laden in the sense that, as purposive entities, we pursue – con- 
sciously or unconsciously – context-dependent strategies, in order to 
influence the ways in which we are positioned in relation to other human and 
nonhuman entities, thereby confirming that our actions are motivated by both 
species-constitutive and species-divisive concerns. 
• It is tension-laden in the sense that, as contradictory entities, we are, on a 
daily basis, confronted with the pressures, discrepancies, disagreements and 
conflicts that pervade the relationships we establish not only with others but 
also with ourselves – representing a quotidian exercise of adjustment and 
readjustment to the varying circumstances of our lives. 
• It is power-laden in the sense that, as resource-dependent entities, we compete 
for access to material and symbolic assets, which are asymmetrically distri- 
buted and, hence, determine the dispositions we acquire and the positions we 
occupy within relationally constituted fields of interaction. 
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Power can be regarded as a constitutive component of human existence (see 
Susen 2014a).40 As such, it permeates every aspect of our lives, including the 
seemingly mundane dimensions of our everyday actions and interactions. From a 
Bourdieusian point of view, one of the core features built into social power 
dynamics is what may be described as ‘the dialectics of recognition (reconn- 
aissance) and misrecognition (méconnaissance)’.41 
The ‘individual and collective misrecognition of the truth of the objective 
“mechanisms” of the exchange’ (Bourdieu 1980a: 179, italics in original)42 
between different types of capital lies at the heart of power dynamics in field- 
differentiated social formations. We may draw a distinction between ‘the 
institutionally organised and guaranteed misrecognition’ (ibid.: 191, italics in 
original)43 provided by solidified sets of structures and configurations, on the one 
hand, and the ephemeral and spontaneously emerging moments of misrecognition 
created within short-lived encounters and situations, on the other. Irrespective of 
whether we are dealing with institutional or behavioural, official or unofficial, 
public or private, visible or invisible, obvious or subtle, large-scale or small-scale, 
global or local, collective or individual forms of misrecognition, the daily 
production of social power dynamics is inconceivable without the conscious or 
unconscious complicity of those involved in them. Those who have the upper 
hand – that is, the ‘dominant’ forces in a particular field – have an interest in 
disguising the source of their empowerment. Those who lack the influence to 
shape the agenda – that is, the ‘dominated’ forces in a particular field – have an 
interest in unmasking the source of their disempowerment. 
Paradoxically, processes of misrecognition involve processes of recognition 
(see Susen 2007: 138–141; see also Bourdieu 1977[1972]: 165–168). If a power 
mechanism remains mis- or unrecognised by those who sustain it, it is recognised 
with the prospect of it continuing to exist until it reaches a crisis point, brought 
about by those who wish to subvert it. In every social formation, one encounters 
‘a kind of legitimizing self-affirmation through which power makes itself known 
and recognized’ (Bourdieu 1980a: 226–227).44 The epitome of the self-affirmative 
capacity to legitimise oneself by virtue of social recognition is symbolic power.45 
Symbolic power is this ‘power to secure recognition of power’ (ibid.: 226, italics 
in original)46 as a result of its simultaneous recognition and misrecognition. As a 
recognised force, its presence is affirmed and reaffirmed by those caught up in its 
reproduction. As a misrecognised force, its presence is disguised, or at least 
misrepresented, by those who have an interest in shaping social constellations in 
such a way that they contribute to its reproduction. One of the key functions of 
dominant ideologies is to make us recognise (anerkennen) power without 
recognising (erkennen) it.47 A critical hermeneutics of power, therefore, seeks to 
expose the relatively arbitrary nature of asymmetrically structured social 
relations. It does so by deconstructing the patterns of reality that have been 
behaviourally, ideologically and institutionally constructed, without losing sight 
of the fact that they – not only as mental representations or imaginaries, but also 
as embodied practices and actualities – can be reconstructed. In short, Bourdieu’s 
approach makes a case for a hermeneutics of power.48 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the extent to which Bourdieu may be described as a 
‘hermeneutic sociologist’. As demonstrated in the previous analysis, Bourdieu’s 
approach is based on several presuppositions associated with the intellectual 
tradition commonly referred to as ‘hermeneutics’. Far from being reducible to a 
monolithic explanatory framework, founded on a dogmatic understanding of 
sociology in particular and of social research in general, Bourdieu’s hermeneutics 
is multifaceted, touching upon numerous elements that lie at the core of human 
existence. 
Bourdieu can be characterised as a ‘hermeneutic’ – or, at least, ‘hermeneutics- 
inspired’ – thinker insofar as his work is marked by a profound interest in the 
nature of interpretation. Perhaps one of the most noteworthy features of 
‘Bourdieusian hermeneutics’ is that it conceives of interpretation as a socio-cog- 
nitive process that is crucial not only to procedures of sociological investigation, 
conducted by experts, but also, in a more fundamental sense, to everyday 
reflexive practices, performed by ordinary agents. Bourdieu’s fine-grained 
understanding of interpretation may be regarded as a sign of the fact that his 
‘critical sociology’ is, in some respects, much closer to Luc Boltanski’s 
‘sociology of critique’ than most commentators are willing to admit (see Susen 
2014[2015], 2015c). 
This chapter has aimed to shed light on ten elements that are central to the 
conceptual architecture of the ‘hermeneutic Bourdieu’ – specifically, the (1) 
socio-relational,  (2)  practical,  (3)  unconscious,  (4)  situational,  (5)  doxic, (6) 
contingent, (7) meaning-laden, (8) experiential, (9) resourceful and (10) power- 
laden constitution of human existence. It shall be the task of this concluding 
section to reflect on some key questions arising from the ‘hermeneutic’ elements 
that permeate Bourdieu’s oeuvre. 
 
1 Hermeneutics of social relations: Bourdieu emphasises the socio-relational 
constitution of human existence. Yet, we need to account for the fact that 
social life constitutes a dynamic conglomerate of ontological, rather than 
merely relational, elements – that is, of structurally organised components 
that do exist. 
2 Hermeneutics of practice: Bourdieu stresses the practical constitution of 
human existence. The preponderance of our sens pratique ‘within’ the world, 
as opposed to our sens théorique ‘about’ the world, makes the unfolding of 
social life possible in the first place. Human understanding constitutes a 
fundamental social practice, allowing for the meaning-laden construction of 
reality. A crucial sociological challenge, however, consists in distinguishing 
‘foundational’, ‘contingent’ and ‘ephemeral’ fields when assessing the wider 
significance of particular social practices (see Susen 2013c: 236n.121). 
Foundational fields are necessary for, contingent fields are possible within, 
and ephemeral fields are largely irrelevant to the emergence of social order. 
A critical hermeneutics of emancipatory practices needs to identify the fields 
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of interaction that matter most to the genuine empowerment of both 
individual and collective subjects. 
3 Hermeneutics of the unconscious: Bourdieu draws attention to the pivotal 
role that different forms of the unconscious play in shaping human existence. 
We cannot escape the ubiquitous presence of the socio-cultural background 
horizons in which we find ourselves immersed. No less important, however, 
are the conscious ways in which we attribute meaning to, engage with and act 
upon reality when mobilising the resources inherent in the different types of 
rationality by means of which we influence – if not, generate – historical 
developments in accordance with the interests we pursue not only as 
members of social fields but also as members of humanity. 
4 Hermeneutics of the situational: Bourdieu proposes to study human existence 
by focusing on its situational constitution. Surely, it is essential to recognise 
that every human performance is spatiotemporally situated. It is no less 
fundamental, however, to examine society in terms of its quasi-transcen- 
dental features, that is, in terms of its species-constitutive characteristics, 
which – by definition – rise above the cultural specificities of particular 
historical contexts or communities. 
5 Hermeneutics of doxa: Bourdieu insists upon the doxic constitution of human 
existence. Doxa – that is, the taken-for-grantedness of the objective, 
normative and subjective dimensions of our being based on tacit  acceptance 
– serves the vital sociological function of equipping human agents with a 
sense of ontological security when endeavouring to construct liveable 
realities. Yet, we must not underestimate the crucial role of critical capacity 
in bringing about individual and social developments in accordance with 
rationally motivated, discursively mediated and intersubjectively negotiated 
concerns, considerations and arguments. 
6 Hermeneutics of contingency: Bourdieu is eager to unearth the contingent 
constitution of human existence. Critical social scientists need to scrutinise 
the far-reaching implications of the fact that all aspects of social reality are 
impregnated with contingency. It is no less significant, however, to face up to 
the considerable influence exercised by structural forces of necessity, whose 
inner workings largely escape our everyday perceptions and ordinary under- 
standings of reality. Even more challenging, in this respect, is the sociological 
task of grasping the relationship between contingency and necessity by 
conceding that the tension between mechanisms of determinacy and 
processes of indeterminacy is built into the unfolding of history. 
7 Hermeneutics of meaning: Bourdieu’s hermeneutics-inspired reflections are 
a reminder of the fact that we ignore an integral component of human exist- 
ence if we fail to account for its meaning-laden constitution. Useful as it may 
be to distinguish between ‘naïve realism’, which underlines the factual nature 
of empirically established objectivities, and ‘critical realism’, which 
highlights the value-laden constitution of socially formed actualities, one – 
epistemologically valuable – point gets easily overlooked in this regard: 
namely, the insight that the ‘realities’ that we construct – irrespective of 
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whether we do so symbolically or materially – are often out of sync with the 
‘worlds’ that we inhabit and experience. Indeed, when we notice a minor or 
major discrepancy between ‘world’ and ‘reality’ we become aware of the 
relative autonomy enjoyed by behavioural, ideological and institutional 
patterns shaping the course of human agency. 
8 Hermeneutics of experience: Bourdieu underscores the experiential consti- 
tution of human existence. There are countless ways in which the world can 
be experienced by its hermeneutically equipped inhabitants. In this respect, a 
central issue that critical social scientists need to address concerns the 
question of the extent to which not only human ‘worlds’ but also human 
‘experiences’ can be described as ‘objective’, ‘normative’ and ‘subjective’. 
Not only are we constantly immersed in objectivity, normativity and subject- 
ivity, but, in addition, our experiences are always – simultaneously – 
objective, normative and subjective. Every human experience is at once 
‘objective’, in that it takes place in space and time, ‘normative’, in that it is 
shaped by our exposure to culture, and ‘subjective’, in that we are its unique 
carriers. In short, both the existence and the experience of our three founda- 
tional worlds of immersion are at once objective, normative and subjective. 
Realists will emphasise the ‘objective’, constructivists the ‘normative’, and 
perspectivists the ‘subjective’ dimensions of our experience of the world. 
Instead of establishing an epistemological hierarchy between these three 
dimensions, however, we need to account for their simultaneously exercised 
power in shaping our being-in-the-world. Such a multi-layered conception of 
human experience permits us to avoid the pitfalls of objectivist, normativist 
or subjectivist reductionism. 
9 Hermeneutics of social resources: Given his emphasis on the socio- 
ontological centrality of different forms of capital, Bourdieu seeks to unearth 
the resourceful constitution of human existence. Yet, just as he fails to differ- 
entiate between ‘foundational’, ‘contingent’ and ‘ephemeral’ fields, he offers 
little in the way of distinguishing between ‘foundational’, ‘contingent’ and 
‘ephemeral’ types of capital, let alone of habitus. There are no ‘foundational’, 
‘contingent’ and ‘ephemeral’ fields without ‘foundational’, ‘contingent’ and 
‘ephemeral’ types of capital and habitus. We cannot grasp the nature of 
universally empowering life conditions unless we identify the specificity of 
universally empowering resources. In other words, a genuinely critical 
sociology needs to confront the challenge of providing criteria by which it is 
possible to distinguish between empowering and disempowering life forms. 
In order to accomplish this task, sociology needs to acknowledge the socio- 
ontological significance not only of field-dependent resources but also of 
species-constitutive resources, that is, of the resources that make us human. 
10 Hermeneutics of power: Bourdieu has no illusions about the power-laden 
constitution of human existence. The fact that all social relations, actions and 
formations are power-permeated, however, does not mean that they are 
inevitably power-motivated. While all human practices are power-laden, they 
are not necessarily power-driven. A critical hermeneutics of power needs  to 
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reject the idealist view that human lifeworlds can be portrayed as pristine 
realms of love, cooperation and solidarity, as well as the fatalist view that 
human lifeworlds can be reduced to bleak cages of self-interest, competition 
and anomie. Instead, it needs to endorse a realist stance that is prepared to 
explore both the bright and the dark sides of humanity, thereby facing up to 
the contradictory forces that shape the tension-laden development of social 
reality. 
 
In light of the preceding reflections, it becomes evident that any serious attempt 
to grapple with ‘Bourdieusian prospects’ needs to account for the hermeneutic 
dimensions that, owing to their omnipresence in the daily construction of symbol- 
ically mediated realities, are built into the intricate challenge of contributing to 
the pursuit of a critical sociology. 
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36 On Bourdieu’s hermeneutics of experience, see, for instance: Bourdieu (1997b: 64); 
Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron (1968: 70, 101). See also, for example: Ostrow 
(2000[1981]: 302–308); Susen (2007: 297–301). 
37 On Bourdieu’s conception of interconvertibility see, for example, Bourdieu 
(1977[1972]: 178). See also, for instance: Adkins (2011: 348); Susen (2007: 178– 
179); Susen (2011c: 390). 
38 On this point, see, for instance: Boltanski and Thévenot (1991); Boltanski and 
Thévenot (1999); Ladrière, Pharo and Quéré (1993); Lahire (1998); Lahire (2004); 
Susen (2007: 90–94, 192–198); Susen (2010); Susen (2011a: 450, 453, 456); Susen 
(2012a: 300); Thévenot (2001); Thévenot (2006). 
39 On Bourdieu’s hermeneutics of social resources, see, for instance: Bourdieu 
(1977[1972]: 172, 177–187, 195–197); Bourdieu (1979); Bourdieu (1980b); Bourdieu 
(1986). See also, for instance: Albrecht (2002); Beasley-Murray (2000); Calhoun 
(1995); Gouanvic (2005); Herz (1996); Reay (2004); Robbins (2005); Shilling 
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(2009). 
42 My translation; original text: ‘la méconnaissance individuelle et collective de la vérité 
du “mécanisme” objectif de l’échange’. 
43 My translation; original text: ‘la méconnaissance institutionnellement organisée et 
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